This is an essay I turned in to my Modern Philosophy class in response to the prompt: Who is more Theo-centric, Leibniz or Descartes?
In the 17th century, science was the domain of the church and of wealthy aristocrats. In Europe at this time, one did not easily become an aristocrat and have views counter to the church. Therefore, most science which was produced had to find some way to fit within the bounds of scholasticism and Catholic theology. The problem, however, was that science was beginning to discover certain empirical truths which were contrary to church theology. Luckily, there were those who wanted to have their cake and eat it too, so to speak. These individuals were not only scientists; they were also pious men who called themselves philosophers. These men were on the cutting edge of mathematics, physics, and geometry, and yet were able to develop philosophical theories which sought to reconcile the most important of theologies and science. Two of these men, Rene Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz, were among the first to re-invent the most central of Catholic theologies –the existence of God –with contemporary scientific and empirical method. There are many differences between these two philosophers, although there is one central contrast which can serve as an axiom in explaining those differences; specifically, the degree of theocentrism in their respective philosophies. Leibniz’s theocentrism was absolute, while Descartes was only theocentric so far as his philosophy of Self was concerned. In other words, Descartes was more egocentric: God’s existence was only discernible via Descartes own existence, whereas Leibniz’s ideas of God were not dependent upon himself at all.
Let us begin with Descartes.
Descartes’ mission is stated in the second meditation of his publication, Meditations, Objections, and Replies: “I will set aside whatever can be weakened even to the slightest degree by the arguments brought forward, so that eventually all that remains is precisely what is certain and unshaken” (Descartes 25). He finds the most extreme skepticism, that of the Evil Genius, and from there doubts everything. His skepticism leads him to doubt his sensory perceptions because, after all, he may be being tricked by some supernatural force. He can not prove their trustworthiness, and so he casts them aside. Since his sensory perceptions are transmitted through his body, he also decides this may not exist. In doing so, he signifies a difference between body and mind. So while he is unsure of the existence of his body, his mind most surely does. For, the only way he could be deceived is if he had a thinking mind capable of being deceived. Thus, he forms the cogito argument, “I am, I exist” (Descartes 25). If he is existing without a material body, than his mind must be his soul. He says this is self-evident because it is a clear and distinct idea.
A clear and distinct idea, as defined by Rom Bombardi of Middle Tennessee State University is, “An idea is clear and distinct if and only if all and only properties essential to the object of that idea (its referent or ideatum) are represented in the idea” (Bombardi 6). It is thus self-evident. From here, Descartes decides there are certain ideas in his mind which are clear and distinct. These ideas are purely mental and self-evident. Since the idea of God contains all the properties of God, than it stands to say that God is a clear and distinct idea. Descartes reasons that because he is of a finite existence, and the clear and distinct idea of God contains the property of infinite existence, than the idea of God could not have been thought of by him. Henry Torrey explains this thusly in his The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from His Writing, “The effect cannot transcend the cause; but if God did not exist, the presence of the idea of infinite perfection within a finite consciousness would be inexplicable; the effect would transcend the cause” (Torrey 19). This is an apriori argument for the existence of God, also known as an ontological proof. Descartes ontological proof of God works in that the idea of infinite existence is only available with the actual quality of infinite experience. Such a Being is a Perfect Being, and to such a Perfect Being, the act of deception would be contradictory. Therefore, this Being is not a Deceiver and can be trusted. From here, Descartes reasons that because God exists, the world must exist as he perceives it and he can now go on to explain everything else with which he is concerned.
Throughout all of this, there is one glaring attribute: the existence of the self as necessary for all other reasoning. This is not to say Descartes is not a pious man, but his philosophy is definitely more self-centered than it is God-centered. Torrey elaborates, “Philosophical speculation thereafter must turn on the ego, which Descartes thus made the pivot of his own thinking concerning real experience” (18). Descartes is concerned with how he can know things are real, how his experience is affected by mind and body, and how his thoughts are necessary to prove the existence of God. This ultimately leads to Cartesian Dualism, in which everything is defined as Self and Not-Self. His theocentrism is ambiguous and takes second place to egocentrism. After necessarily proving God’s existence, he moves on to his metaphysics which are thereafter devoid of any theology. This is in stark contrast to Leibniz, whose own theocentrism is irrefutable.
Leibniz had four proofs of God. These proofs, as defined by Bertrand Russell, are, “the ontological argument, (2) the cosmological argument, (3) the argument from eternal truths, (4) the argument from pre-established harmony, which may be generalized into the argument from design…” (Russell 585). The first of these proofs, ontological, is also dependent upon a definition of God as a Perfect Being. This God contains all power and all knowledge, for “power and knowledge are perfections, and in so far as they belong to God, who possesses supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner, not only in a metaphysical sense, but also morally speaking” (Leibniz 1.1). Furthermore, two of his three initial premises are based on the Scriptures (1.2, 1.3). Essentially, for this argument, Leibniz takes what Descartes has done and improves upon it in a more theocentric fashion. He takes God’s existence, and instead of making our knowledge of God’s existence central to the fact, he demonstrates it in the realm of possibilities. If there is a possibility of God, than God is real since God’s nature is the fullness of perfect possibility. Leibniz argues that God is possible because the concept of God as a Being of Pure Perfection is non-contradictory. Therefore, God’s existence is central to the best of all possible worlds, i.e. this one. As a central point, this proof of God has nothing to do with the Self, and everything to do with God Himself. Leibniz follows as it says in Scripture, “So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God” (Bible ESV 1Corinthians 10:31).
The cosmological argument is similar to First Cause, however in Leibniz’s metaphysics there is no causality. Instead, all things are contingent upon a sufficient reason. If there is no reason for a thing to exist in this, the best of all possible worlds, than it will not exist. The only sufficient reason for anything to exist in this world is the will of God. This is similar to Descartes notion of Substance, which is a thing that does not depend on anything else (Descartes, Meditation Six). In this definition of substance, there are only three substances: Mind, Matter, and God. Which are, once again, totally dependent upon the Self if they are to be employed in existence. The difference, however, is that God is not simply causing reality for the benefit of the experiencer. God is causing all reality, for his own reasons. Whatever that reason may be, it is omni-benevolent and omniscient. Thus, God’s qualities and not the Self are the determining factors of this proof, which would make it contingent upon the ontological argument.
Third is the argument from eternal truths. An eternal truth is a statement which can not be denied, and is always true within the context of itself. Statements such as ‘one and one is two’ are eternal truths. An eternal truth is an apriori statement which is neither contingent, nor needs any sufficient reason. It is part of the law of the universe, and as such an extension of the cosmological argument. Since it is apriori it must occur in the mind, and the only eternal mind (and sufficient reason) is God. Thereofre all eternal truths point back to God. An eternal truth is similar to Descartes Clear and Distinct Idea in that it is an apriori statement which is self-evident on all fronts. However, an eternal truth is not dependent upon the mind for its existence, it is a function of reality instead, and therefore theocentric, not egocentric.
Finally, there is the argument from pre-established harmony, or design. This argument is based upon Leibniz’s Monadology, which contends that “windowless” monads, quasi-mental psychic components of reality, are perfectly harmonized with one another to create the existing world. This may seem as a bit of a stretch, but the idea of monads is consistent with all other arguments. With the ontological argument: God is omniscient and perfect, therefore anything He creates will be perfect, and the monad is the perfect tool. With the cosmological: the monad is the vehicle for sufficient cause; its existence is possible and is powered by God into full existence. With eternal truths: the monads carry all thoughts necessary for their existence in themselves, including eternal truths. These monads work completely in conjunction with one another while not perceiving each other in the slightest. After all, they have no windows. Therefore, this perfect harmony is evident of Gods existence, and dependent solely upon God Himself. Thus all the glory here goes to God and none goes to the philosopher or the mind which perceives Him.
Despite Descartes’ egocentricity, his philosophy is not unsound, it is merely Self-centered. Everything about Descartes method is heavily dependent upon the Self. This makes the arguments rather fragile, however. Torrey says, “Much of his thinking, after two and a half centuries has now become obsolete; much still remains an imperishable addition to the sum of human philosophy” (Torrey 16). This happened mostly because science and philosophy were readily able to move outside of the self. However, Descartes methodical doubt gave rise to the empirical method and axiomatic logic, without which no one could have gone any further than him. It should be noted that all of Europe was very nervous as Descartes lay on his death bed; for no one was sure if upon his death reality would cease existing. Luckily, this was not the case, and thus Leibniz had a chance to write and improve on Descartes philosophy.
Leibniz, however, offers to stand the test of time. This is in part because of his theocentricity. In basing his arguments on an eternal and perfect Being, and not on the self, they will continue to be applicable until the definition of that Being changes, if ever. And while the premises of Descartes arguments may begin to break down with further advances in science, Leibniz will persist. The only place where Leibniz’s logic seems to fail is when it is presented with the opposite of itself. For example, David Werther, in his article Leibniz and God’s Existence goes through many pains to make a linear argument of Leibniz which looks similar to this:
(1) If the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is true, it is necessarily true, and, similarly, if the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is true, it is necessarily true.
(2)Either the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is true, or the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is true.
(3)Hence, either the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is necessarily true, or the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is necessarily true (Werther 41).
This continues to include the status of perfections and compatibilities, and ends with the reasoning, “All perfections are compatible,” (Werther 41). He then makes a counter argument which shares the first three premises and offers the linguistic opposite of the final six:
(4*) 'The Concept of the Most Perfect Being is consistent' is necessarily true only if statements of the form 'Divine Perfections A and B can be in the subject' are either explicit identity statements whose truth can be demonstrated through analysis.
(5*) 'Statements of the form 'Divine Perfections A and B can be in the same subject' are neither explicit identity statements no statements whose truth can be demonstrated through analysis.
(6*) Hence, 'The concept of the Most Perfect Being is consistent is not necessarily true.
(7*) hence, 'The concept of the Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is necessarily true. (Werther 42)
And so on until he ends with the reasoning, “All perfections are incompatible,” (Werther 42). While at first, this may seem to refute Leibniz’s argument, or at least to make it ineffective, it does not really do so. It merely shows the effectiveness of the structure of an argument which allows the negative to prove logically possible. Though, in Leibnizian terms, while ‘The concept of the Most Perfect Being is inconsistent’ is logically possible, it is not the best possible truth because of its lack of sufficient reason. Since it is not the best possible truth, it is not present in this, the best of all possible worlds.
This can be demonstrated once more. Bertrand Russell, in his work A History of Western Philosophy offers a Manichean argument.
…this is the worst of all possible worlds, in which the good things that exist serve only to heighten the evils. The world, he might say, was created by a wicked demiurge, who allowed free will, which is good, in order to make sure of sin, which is bad, and of which the evil outweighs the good of free will. The demiurge, he might continue, created some virtuous men, in order that they might be punished by the wicked; for the punishment of the virtuous is so great an evil that it makes the world worse than if no good men existed (Russell 590).
This an exact opposite of Leibniz’s argument for the problem of evil and the best of all possible worlds which says that free will is the good allowed by sin, which is evil, in a world created by a benevolent creator. The Manichean argument hinges on the premise that this is the worst of all possible worlds, and is therefore an exact negative of Leibniz’s the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz’s theocentrism, however, saves him from this refutation. Leibniz’s metaphysics is based on Scripture, as demonstrated earlier. Scripture has numerous references to the power of good over evil. The example, “The evil bow down before the good, the wicked at the gates of the righteous” (Bible Proverbs 14:9), shows the inferiority of evil in the context of servitude. Evil, in bowing down before good, acts as a lesser to a superior. This is in line with Leibniz’s argument that all evils serve to magnify the pleasure of the good. Thus, even the exact negative falls short due to Leibniz’s theocentric premises. Furthermore, if argument A is to be refuted by argument –A and equal zero, than argument –A must be just as valid in degree as argument A. The negative A arguments presented here to do not live up to this standard. The remainder is always one. To Leibniz, this one always points back to God, not the self as in Descartes.
The self is a finite thing, as Descartes demonstrated. As such, it is not a sufficient reason for the existence of God, to use Leibnizian terms. Otherwise, with the death of the self, there would also be the death of God. Though many people, philosophers and scientists and laymen alike, have either tried to kill God or are actively doing so. However, they have died and will die themselves before succeeding. This is mostly due to God’s ontological status. By definition, He is eternal, un-killable, and supreme. Therefore it is only self-evident that any theocentric argument would ultimately last longer and be more complete than any egocentric argument.
WORKS CITED
Descartes, Rene Meditations, Objections, and Replies. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
Leibniz, Gottfried. Philosophical Texts. Ed.Woolhouse, R.S. and Francks, Richard. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.,1998.
Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.
The Holy Bible, ESV. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Bibles, 2001.
Werther, David. “Leibniz and the Possibility of God’s Existence.” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 37-48.
Bombardi, Ron. How the Rationalists Construe “Clear and Distinct Ideas”. http://frank.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/cnd.html
Torrey, Henry P.A. The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from his Writings. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892.
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