What exactly is marriage? More specifically, what makes a marriage? A marriage is covenant between two people; a relationship which is worked out over time as those two people go through life together. What I am wondering, is at what point do those two people begin that covenant?
American marriage today is typically defined as beginning with a wedding. Two people cohabiting is not considered a marriage, because they haven’t had a wedding. They haven’t yet made those promises to each other.
In the Old Testament, marriage was an agreement made between two families, and the celebrations changed slightly throughout time as the culture changed throughout the centuries. In Genesis, when Jacob married, the ultimate decision rested in the hands of his father in law. In Exodus, Zipporahs father gave her to Moses. However, Zipporahs father was also a priest. In the Garden, God stood and gave Eve to Adam, proclaiming them wed. These are all Proto-Israel examples. After the formation of Israel and Jewish culture, Jewish weddings formed their own cultural traditions.
This is the model established then: The authority present over the bride gives her to the male. Thus the covenant begins.
Everything else we do in America is a throwback to some other ancient culture, especially European Paganism. The ring is symbolic of magical binds. The circle is a powerful magical symbol, and for two people to wear identical rings is to bind their souls together into the same circle and cycle within the natural spiritual cycles observed in the greater context of nature itself. The honey moon is a direct syncretism of Celtic tradition. After a Druid married the couple, they would leave and live together in the woods for three nights during the next full moon cycle, not letting the other out of their sight. During this time they would drink only honey mead. The honey mead would increase libido and fertility. The full moon cycle would also increase libido and fertility. This was called The Ritual of the Honey Moon, and often ended in conception.
Well then, what is marriage when it is void of all its cultural melting? It is a covenant made between a man and a woman before a spiritual authority. That’s what it was in the garden, before human traditions crept in.
My position then is thus: Two Christians, with Jesus as their High Priest and Prime Spiritual Authority, can be married in the presence of Him and no one else. They can strike the covenant to each other and to God, and then proceed to live it out according to the model of what a Christian Marriage is really supposed to look like: Male led, grace-sustained, microcosmic model for the gospel bearing the fruits of the spirit.
Is this cohabitation as America knows it? No. In American cohabitation, the parties are no under obligation to remain together. They have not made the covenant. This is only cohabitation in the direct dictionary definition of the word.
Does this mean the Christians can just say they’re married and everyone has to respect it? No. It does mean however that those who would challenge the marriage status must look closely and decide whether or not the covenant is being held, and whether or not God was really present in the striking of that covenant. This last test is a test of faith, only answered through prayer.
Let it be said however that as American citizens, it is the Christians obligation to fulfill American requirements for marriage as set forth by the state, be it traditional or common-law. Furthermore, if the Christians are members of a church body, than that church body holds spiritual authority over those Christians, and therefore they must adhere to their church’s guidance.
But in the case of a Christian couple who comes to the church presenting themselves as married, but have not fit what that church views as marriage, I would hope that the church would be willing to consider the idea that God, as our High Priest, could be present to administer a marriage covenant without the presence of a pastor. And while it is important that the couple do finalize their marriage in the eyes of the state, to not acknowledge their marriage and their honoring of the covenant they struck with each other and with God, and force the issue at the expense of their emotional, financial, and spiritual well-being is a disrespect to their brother and sister in Christ.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Monday, June 21, 2010
The Lockian Monk
This is an old philosophy paper I turned into an Enlightenment Lit class on Matthew Lewis' The Monk and John Locke.
The Monk. This notorious novel was written in 1796, during the transition of the renaissance to the enlightenment, and there seem to be many aspects of both traditions contained within it. For example, the most commonly accepted philosophy of man in the enlightenment was John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, written in 1690. The Monk is inclusive towards this philosophy, and whether intentional or not on the part of the author, the character of Ambrosio stands, not so much a critique of this enlightenment ideal, but as an example of where this idea can lead when put into a person of ‘superstitious’ ideology. Ambrosio exemplifies the Lockian theory of human understanding, and this works itself out in his steady, downward spiral of degenerative depravity. Locke forms his theory of human understanding on five premises. In The Monk, Ambrosio not only fulfills these premises fully, but also brilliantly executes their results when coupled with non-enlightenment ideals in his horrible, gory, despicable, cowardly, and ultimately faithless death.
Locke’s first premise is, “Idea is the object of thinking”. With this premise, Locke goes on to explain that ‘ideas’ are, “those expressed by the words, ‘whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkeness’, and others”. These ideas are material in nature, and completely dependant upon perception. Locke never gives us a definition for immaterial ideas such as justice, truth, beauty, etc. This is in line with Lockes philosophical career. Locke would eventually also work on what would become Social Contract Theory, and, with Thomas Hobbes, be given credited for a school of thought called Materialism. Materialism holds that all things are material, or made of matter. That is, there is no reality outside of that which can be experienced, I.e. no soul, no god, no absolute justice or beauty, etc. Concurrently, if we look past Ambrosio’s position as a monk, we see that he shares many characteristics of a materialist in action, if not in word.
In the opening two paragraphs of chapter two, Ambrosio is alone in his cell, thinking. The object of his thinking is himself. He meditates entirely upon his achievements and awards, and gives himself the credit. He has no thought of spirituality, either with gratefulness to God for making him as he is, nor of the purity of his soul. “He looked round him with exultation; and pride told him loudly, that he was superior to his fellow creatures”. His focus here is on his own experience, not his faith, which is immaterial. This premise of character is the first which sets Ambrosio up for the descent to come. The next premise which does so appears in the very next paragraph.
Locke’s second premise, “All ideas come from sensation or reflection”, functions to officially once and for all stamp out any supernatural reality by directly juxtaposing itself against the popular philosophical argument of a priori ideas. First defined as such by Descartes, and expanded by Kant (who is often termed the father of modern philosophy), an a priori idea is a clear and distinct idea which we have, as humans, prior to experience. These ideas are what compose our conscience, our sense of fairness, love, and appreciation for beauty, truth, and art. If, as Locke asserts, all ideas come from sensation and reflection, than there are no a priori ideas made with us at creation, and thus the whole notion of creation is subject to question. Since none of us have experienced being created, it does not stand as viable to philosophic discussion. Thus, there is no room for even the mention of God or the Soul, being immaterial things which can not be directly experienced. Ambrosio exemplifies this brilliantly in the third paragraph of chapter two, in which we are given a monologue of what Ambrosio really thinks about himself:
‘Who,’ thought he, ‘who but myself has passed the ordeal of youth, yet sees no single stain upon his conscience? Who else has subdued the violence of strong passions and impetuous temperament, and submitted even from the dawn of life to voluntary retirement? I seek for such a man in vain. I see no one but myself possessed of such resolution.’ (38)
If one were to consult Locke, the reason for Ambrosio’s pride would be clear. Ambrosio sees no equal because he literally sees no equal. Having never left the monastery, he has had no experience of sin. He mistakenly thinks inexperience of sin is synonymous with mastery over it. He couldn’t be more wrong.
Thus, in the first scene featuring Ambrosio as a main focus, he is defined as a Lockian character(materialist and experiential). The end of his monologue begins the demonstration of the Lockian theory as it plays out in the rest of Ambrosio’s plot.
Locke’s third premise is, “The objects of sensation are one source of ideas”. In the second chapter, beginning at the end of Ambrosio’s monologue, we see how sensation plays its part in Ambrsio’s experiences to come. His monologue ends with him looking at the painting of the Madonna. For two years, this is the only female at which he has had the liberty to gaze longingly. He does so, and says to himself, “What beauty in that countenance!… how graceful is the turn of that head!…what sweetness, yet what majesty in her divine eyes. How softly her cheek…”. This goes on for some time. He is steadily capturing and cataloguing every physical detail in his sight. Sight is not the only sense which is employed in this manner. As the chapter continues, his pity is extracted from the story of Matilda which he hears from Rosario. He then sees Matilda’s breast, he feels the pain of a snake bite, and he collapses into her arms. Finally, he sees Matilda to be the original model for the Madonna painting which he adores. These material sensations are what Matilda uses to overwhelm and convince Ambrosio to be her lover and revoke his vows. However, at the end of the chapter he has merely given into temptation. He doesn‘t fully delve into his actions until the fifth chapter.
Lockes fourth premise, “The operation of our minds the other source of them,” is fulfilled after he loses his virginity with Matilda when the plot returns in chapter five. "The burst of transport was passed. Ambrosio's lust was satisfied. Pleasure fled, and Shame now usurped her seat in his bosom"(193). With passion and sensation now over, the time for reflection has come to the Lockian Monk. His previous ideas of experience given to him in the monastery are now at odds with his current actions. His reflection is melancholy at first, but Matilda soon talks him out of it. Through the power of reason and reflection she bids him to be her lover and to continue with her in secret. Ambrosio reflects, and comes to this decision: “Ambrosio again raged with desire: the die was thrown: his vows were broken. And why should he refrain from enjoying its reward?"(194).
The fifth premise of Locke, and the most damning for Ambrosio, is “All ideas are one or the other of these”. Throughout the rest of the novel, Ambrosio gets deeper and deeper into his indulgence of sensation and his rational justification of his sin. When sensation and reflection are all that occur in a character who espouses to a higher reality than the material, there is no higher reflection that can occur than the reflection of the sensational, which leads to an absence of a higher reality in that characters thoughts and actions. The presence of Satan in the narrative may at first seem to deny materialism, but Satan manifests himself physically to Ambrosio. Naturally, Ambrosio will reason along Satan’s line because Ambrosio has no physical sensation of God. Since God does not show up in an overt form at all in the novel, Ambrosio can not bring himself to consider anything more than his own broken promises to God, instead of those immaterial ideas of compassion, confession, faith, and repentance. Ambrosio never once cries out to God for salvation from his sin. He never admits his own wretchedness and humbles himself before God, praying to be forgiven and saved from his own depravity. If this fifth premise of Locke were ‘Most ideas are one or the other of these’, Ambrosio might have stood a chance. Sadly, it does not. Locke says, “ALL ideas…,” not most, which leaves Ambrosio no room for repentance, no grace to turn to, no savior to rescue him, and no hope.
In The Monk, materialism reigns. All supernatural elements are disregarded until they are proven true by sensation, and they are dealt with through reflection and reason. This holds true for the bleeding nun, for Matilda’s sorcery, and most of all for Ambrosio, the devil-monk of Madrid. The lesson of the enlightenment stands: there may be a supernatural reality, but until sensed and reflected, it is only superstition, and those who hold by it dogmatically without sensibility will only be the antagonists of healthy, civilized, society.
The Monk. This notorious novel was written in 1796, during the transition of the renaissance to the enlightenment, and there seem to be many aspects of both traditions contained within it. For example, the most commonly accepted philosophy of man in the enlightenment was John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, written in 1690. The Monk is inclusive towards this philosophy, and whether intentional or not on the part of the author, the character of Ambrosio stands, not so much a critique of this enlightenment ideal, but as an example of where this idea can lead when put into a person of ‘superstitious’ ideology. Ambrosio exemplifies the Lockian theory of human understanding, and this works itself out in his steady, downward spiral of degenerative depravity. Locke forms his theory of human understanding on five premises. In The Monk, Ambrosio not only fulfills these premises fully, but also brilliantly executes their results when coupled with non-enlightenment ideals in his horrible, gory, despicable, cowardly, and ultimately faithless death.
Locke’s first premise is, “Idea is the object of thinking”. With this premise, Locke goes on to explain that ‘ideas’ are, “those expressed by the words, ‘whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkeness’, and others”. These ideas are material in nature, and completely dependant upon perception. Locke never gives us a definition for immaterial ideas such as justice, truth, beauty, etc. This is in line with Lockes philosophical career. Locke would eventually also work on what would become Social Contract Theory, and, with Thomas Hobbes, be given credited for a school of thought called Materialism. Materialism holds that all things are material, or made of matter. That is, there is no reality outside of that which can be experienced, I.e. no soul, no god, no absolute justice or beauty, etc. Concurrently, if we look past Ambrosio’s position as a monk, we see that he shares many characteristics of a materialist in action, if not in word.
In the opening two paragraphs of chapter two, Ambrosio is alone in his cell, thinking. The object of his thinking is himself. He meditates entirely upon his achievements and awards, and gives himself the credit. He has no thought of spirituality, either with gratefulness to God for making him as he is, nor of the purity of his soul. “He looked round him with exultation; and pride told him loudly, that he was superior to his fellow creatures”. His focus here is on his own experience, not his faith, which is immaterial. This premise of character is the first which sets Ambrosio up for the descent to come. The next premise which does so appears in the very next paragraph.
Locke’s second premise, “All ideas come from sensation or reflection”, functions to officially once and for all stamp out any supernatural reality by directly juxtaposing itself against the popular philosophical argument of a priori ideas. First defined as such by Descartes, and expanded by Kant (who is often termed the father of modern philosophy), an a priori idea is a clear and distinct idea which we have, as humans, prior to experience. These ideas are what compose our conscience, our sense of fairness, love, and appreciation for beauty, truth, and art. If, as Locke asserts, all ideas come from sensation and reflection, than there are no a priori ideas made with us at creation, and thus the whole notion of creation is subject to question. Since none of us have experienced being created, it does not stand as viable to philosophic discussion. Thus, there is no room for even the mention of God or the Soul, being immaterial things which can not be directly experienced. Ambrosio exemplifies this brilliantly in the third paragraph of chapter two, in which we are given a monologue of what Ambrosio really thinks about himself:
‘Who,’ thought he, ‘who but myself has passed the ordeal of youth, yet sees no single stain upon his conscience? Who else has subdued the violence of strong passions and impetuous temperament, and submitted even from the dawn of life to voluntary retirement? I seek for such a man in vain. I see no one but myself possessed of such resolution.’ (38)
If one were to consult Locke, the reason for Ambrosio’s pride would be clear. Ambrosio sees no equal because he literally sees no equal. Having never left the monastery, he has had no experience of sin. He mistakenly thinks inexperience of sin is synonymous with mastery over it. He couldn’t be more wrong.
Thus, in the first scene featuring Ambrosio as a main focus, he is defined as a Lockian character(materialist and experiential). The end of his monologue begins the demonstration of the Lockian theory as it plays out in the rest of Ambrosio’s plot.
Locke’s third premise is, “The objects of sensation are one source of ideas”. In the second chapter, beginning at the end of Ambrosio’s monologue, we see how sensation plays its part in Ambrsio’s experiences to come. His monologue ends with him looking at the painting of the Madonna. For two years, this is the only female at which he has had the liberty to gaze longingly. He does so, and says to himself, “What beauty in that countenance!… how graceful is the turn of that head!…what sweetness, yet what majesty in her divine eyes. How softly her cheek…”. This goes on for some time. He is steadily capturing and cataloguing every physical detail in his sight. Sight is not the only sense which is employed in this manner. As the chapter continues, his pity is extracted from the story of Matilda which he hears from Rosario. He then sees Matilda’s breast, he feels the pain of a snake bite, and he collapses into her arms. Finally, he sees Matilda to be the original model for the Madonna painting which he adores. These material sensations are what Matilda uses to overwhelm and convince Ambrosio to be her lover and revoke his vows. However, at the end of the chapter he has merely given into temptation. He doesn‘t fully delve into his actions until the fifth chapter.
Lockes fourth premise, “The operation of our minds the other source of them,” is fulfilled after he loses his virginity with Matilda when the plot returns in chapter five. "The burst of transport was passed. Ambrosio's lust was satisfied. Pleasure fled, and Shame now usurped her seat in his bosom"(193). With passion and sensation now over, the time for reflection has come to the Lockian Monk. His previous ideas of experience given to him in the monastery are now at odds with his current actions. His reflection is melancholy at first, but Matilda soon talks him out of it. Through the power of reason and reflection she bids him to be her lover and to continue with her in secret. Ambrosio reflects, and comes to this decision: “Ambrosio again raged with desire: the die was thrown: his vows were broken. And why should he refrain from enjoying its reward?"(194).
The fifth premise of Locke, and the most damning for Ambrosio, is “All ideas are one or the other of these”. Throughout the rest of the novel, Ambrosio gets deeper and deeper into his indulgence of sensation and his rational justification of his sin. When sensation and reflection are all that occur in a character who espouses to a higher reality than the material, there is no higher reflection that can occur than the reflection of the sensational, which leads to an absence of a higher reality in that characters thoughts and actions. The presence of Satan in the narrative may at first seem to deny materialism, but Satan manifests himself physically to Ambrosio. Naturally, Ambrosio will reason along Satan’s line because Ambrosio has no physical sensation of God. Since God does not show up in an overt form at all in the novel, Ambrosio can not bring himself to consider anything more than his own broken promises to God, instead of those immaterial ideas of compassion, confession, faith, and repentance. Ambrosio never once cries out to God for salvation from his sin. He never admits his own wretchedness and humbles himself before God, praying to be forgiven and saved from his own depravity. If this fifth premise of Locke were ‘Most ideas are one or the other of these’, Ambrosio might have stood a chance. Sadly, it does not. Locke says, “ALL ideas…,” not most, which leaves Ambrosio no room for repentance, no grace to turn to, no savior to rescue him, and no hope.
In The Monk, materialism reigns. All supernatural elements are disregarded until they are proven true by sensation, and they are dealt with through reflection and reason. This holds true for the bleeding nun, for Matilda’s sorcery, and most of all for Ambrosio, the devil-monk of Madrid. The lesson of the enlightenment stands: there may be a supernatural reality, but until sensed and reflected, it is only superstition, and those who hold by it dogmatically without sensibility will only be the antagonists of healthy, civilized, society.
Leibniz vs. Descartes: Theocentrism/egocentrism
This is an essay I turned in to my Modern Philosophy class in response to the prompt: Who is more Theo-centric, Leibniz or Descartes?
In the 17th century, science was the domain of the church and of wealthy aristocrats. In Europe at this time, one did not easily become an aristocrat and have views counter to the church. Therefore, most science which was produced had to find some way to fit within the bounds of scholasticism and Catholic theology. The problem, however, was that science was beginning to discover certain empirical truths which were contrary to church theology. Luckily, there were those who wanted to have their cake and eat it too, so to speak. These individuals were not only scientists; they were also pious men who called themselves philosophers. These men were on the cutting edge of mathematics, physics, and geometry, and yet were able to develop philosophical theories which sought to reconcile the most important of theologies and science. Two of these men, Rene Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz, were among the first to re-invent the most central of Catholic theologies –the existence of God –with contemporary scientific and empirical method. There are many differences between these two philosophers, although there is one central contrast which can serve as an axiom in explaining those differences; specifically, the degree of theocentrism in their respective philosophies. Leibniz’s theocentrism was absolute, while Descartes was only theocentric so far as his philosophy of Self was concerned. In other words, Descartes was more egocentric: God’s existence was only discernible via Descartes own existence, whereas Leibniz’s ideas of God were not dependent upon himself at all.
Let us begin with Descartes.
Descartes’ mission is stated in the second meditation of his publication, Meditations, Objections, and Replies: “I will set aside whatever can be weakened even to the slightest degree by the arguments brought forward, so that eventually all that remains is precisely what is certain and unshaken” (Descartes 25). He finds the most extreme skepticism, that of the Evil Genius, and from there doubts everything. His skepticism leads him to doubt his sensory perceptions because, after all, he may be being tricked by some supernatural force. He can not prove their trustworthiness, and so he casts them aside. Since his sensory perceptions are transmitted through his body, he also decides this may not exist. In doing so, he signifies a difference between body and mind. So while he is unsure of the existence of his body, his mind most surely does. For, the only way he could be deceived is if he had a thinking mind capable of being deceived. Thus, he forms the cogito argument, “I am, I exist” (Descartes 25). If he is existing without a material body, than his mind must be his soul. He says this is self-evident because it is a clear and distinct idea.
A clear and distinct idea, as defined by Rom Bombardi of Middle Tennessee State University is, “An idea is clear and distinct if and only if all and only properties essential to the object of that idea (its referent or ideatum) are represented in the idea” (Bombardi 6). It is thus self-evident. From here, Descartes decides there are certain ideas in his mind which are clear and distinct. These ideas are purely mental and self-evident. Since the idea of God contains all the properties of God, than it stands to say that God is a clear and distinct idea. Descartes reasons that because he is of a finite existence, and the clear and distinct idea of God contains the property of infinite existence, than the idea of God could not have been thought of by him. Henry Torrey explains this thusly in his The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from His Writing, “The effect cannot transcend the cause; but if God did not exist, the presence of the idea of infinite perfection within a finite consciousness would be inexplicable; the effect would transcend the cause” (Torrey 19). This is an apriori argument for the existence of God, also known as an ontological proof. Descartes ontological proof of God works in that the idea of infinite existence is only available with the actual quality of infinite experience. Such a Being is a Perfect Being, and to such a Perfect Being, the act of deception would be contradictory. Therefore, this Being is not a Deceiver and can be trusted. From here, Descartes reasons that because God exists, the world must exist as he perceives it and he can now go on to explain everything else with which he is concerned.
Throughout all of this, there is one glaring attribute: the existence of the self as necessary for all other reasoning. This is not to say Descartes is not a pious man, but his philosophy is definitely more self-centered than it is God-centered. Torrey elaborates, “Philosophical speculation thereafter must turn on the ego, which Descartes thus made the pivot of his own thinking concerning real experience” (18). Descartes is concerned with how he can know things are real, how his experience is affected by mind and body, and how his thoughts are necessary to prove the existence of God. This ultimately leads to Cartesian Dualism, in which everything is defined as Self and Not-Self. His theocentrism is ambiguous and takes second place to egocentrism. After necessarily proving God’s existence, he moves on to his metaphysics which are thereafter devoid of any theology. This is in stark contrast to Leibniz, whose own theocentrism is irrefutable.
Leibniz had four proofs of God. These proofs, as defined by Bertrand Russell, are, “the ontological argument, (2) the cosmological argument, (3) the argument from eternal truths, (4) the argument from pre-established harmony, which may be generalized into the argument from design…” (Russell 585). The first of these proofs, ontological, is also dependent upon a definition of God as a Perfect Being. This God contains all power and all knowledge, for “power and knowledge are perfections, and in so far as they belong to God, who possesses supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner, not only in a metaphysical sense, but also morally speaking” (Leibniz 1.1). Furthermore, two of his three initial premises are based on the Scriptures (1.2, 1.3). Essentially, for this argument, Leibniz takes what Descartes has done and improves upon it in a more theocentric fashion. He takes God’s existence, and instead of making our knowledge of God’s existence central to the fact, he demonstrates it in the realm of possibilities. If there is a possibility of God, than God is real since God’s nature is the fullness of perfect possibility. Leibniz argues that God is possible because the concept of God as a Being of Pure Perfection is non-contradictory. Therefore, God’s existence is central to the best of all possible worlds, i.e. this one. As a central point, this proof of God has nothing to do with the Self, and everything to do with God Himself. Leibniz follows as it says in Scripture, “So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God” (Bible ESV 1Corinthians 10:31).
The cosmological argument is similar to First Cause, however in Leibniz’s metaphysics there is no causality. Instead, all things are contingent upon a sufficient reason. If there is no reason for a thing to exist in this, the best of all possible worlds, than it will not exist. The only sufficient reason for anything to exist in this world is the will of God. This is similar to Descartes notion of Substance, which is a thing that does not depend on anything else (Descartes, Meditation Six). In this definition of substance, there are only three substances: Mind, Matter, and God. Which are, once again, totally dependent upon the Self if they are to be employed in existence. The difference, however, is that God is not simply causing reality for the benefit of the experiencer. God is causing all reality, for his own reasons. Whatever that reason may be, it is omni-benevolent and omniscient. Thus, God’s qualities and not the Self are the determining factors of this proof, which would make it contingent upon the ontological argument.
Third is the argument from eternal truths. An eternal truth is a statement which can not be denied, and is always true within the context of itself. Statements such as ‘one and one is two’ are eternal truths. An eternal truth is an apriori statement which is neither contingent, nor needs any sufficient reason. It is part of the law of the universe, and as such an extension of the cosmological argument. Since it is apriori it must occur in the mind, and the only eternal mind (and sufficient reason) is God. Thereofre all eternal truths point back to God. An eternal truth is similar to Descartes Clear and Distinct Idea in that it is an apriori statement which is self-evident on all fronts. However, an eternal truth is not dependent upon the mind for its existence, it is a function of reality instead, and therefore theocentric, not egocentric.
Finally, there is the argument from pre-established harmony, or design. This argument is based upon Leibniz’s Monadology, which contends that “windowless” monads, quasi-mental psychic components of reality, are perfectly harmonized with one another to create the existing world. This may seem as a bit of a stretch, but the idea of monads is consistent with all other arguments. With the ontological argument: God is omniscient and perfect, therefore anything He creates will be perfect, and the monad is the perfect tool. With the cosmological: the monad is the vehicle for sufficient cause; its existence is possible and is powered by God into full existence. With eternal truths: the monads carry all thoughts necessary for their existence in themselves, including eternal truths. These monads work completely in conjunction with one another while not perceiving each other in the slightest. After all, they have no windows. Therefore, this perfect harmony is evident of Gods existence, and dependent solely upon God Himself. Thus all the glory here goes to God and none goes to the philosopher or the mind which perceives Him.
Despite Descartes’ egocentricity, his philosophy is not unsound, it is merely Self-centered. Everything about Descartes method is heavily dependent upon the Self. This makes the arguments rather fragile, however. Torrey says, “Much of his thinking, after two and a half centuries has now become obsolete; much still remains an imperishable addition to the sum of human philosophy” (Torrey 16). This happened mostly because science and philosophy were readily able to move outside of the self. However, Descartes methodical doubt gave rise to the empirical method and axiomatic logic, without which no one could have gone any further than him. It should be noted that all of Europe was very nervous as Descartes lay on his death bed; for no one was sure if upon his death reality would cease existing. Luckily, this was not the case, and thus Leibniz had a chance to write and improve on Descartes philosophy.
Leibniz, however, offers to stand the test of time. This is in part because of his theocentricity. In basing his arguments on an eternal and perfect Being, and not on the self, they will continue to be applicable until the definition of that Being changes, if ever. And while the premises of Descartes arguments may begin to break down with further advances in science, Leibniz will persist. The only place where Leibniz’s logic seems to fail is when it is presented with the opposite of itself. For example, David Werther, in his article Leibniz and God’s Existence goes through many pains to make a linear argument of Leibniz which looks similar to this:
(1) If the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is true, it is necessarily true, and, similarly, if the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is true, it is necessarily true.
(2)Either the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is true, or the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is true.
(3)Hence, either the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is necessarily true, or the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is necessarily true (Werther 41).
This continues to include the status of perfections and compatibilities, and ends with the reasoning, “All perfections are compatible,” (Werther 41). He then makes a counter argument which shares the first three premises and offers the linguistic opposite of the final six:
(4*) 'The Concept of the Most Perfect Being is consistent' is necessarily true only if statements of the form 'Divine Perfections A and B can be in the subject' are either explicit identity statements whose truth can be demonstrated through analysis.
(5*) 'Statements of the form 'Divine Perfections A and B can be in the same subject' are neither explicit identity statements no statements whose truth can be demonstrated through analysis.
(6*) Hence, 'The concept of the Most Perfect Being is consistent is not necessarily true.
(7*) hence, 'The concept of the Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is necessarily true. (Werther 42)
And so on until he ends with the reasoning, “All perfections are incompatible,” (Werther 42). While at first, this may seem to refute Leibniz’s argument, or at least to make it ineffective, it does not really do so. It merely shows the effectiveness of the structure of an argument which allows the negative to prove logically possible. Though, in Leibnizian terms, while ‘The concept of the Most Perfect Being is inconsistent’ is logically possible, it is not the best possible truth because of its lack of sufficient reason. Since it is not the best possible truth, it is not present in this, the best of all possible worlds.
This can be demonstrated once more. Bertrand Russell, in his work A History of Western Philosophy offers a Manichean argument.
…this is the worst of all possible worlds, in which the good things that exist serve only to heighten the evils. The world, he might say, was created by a wicked demiurge, who allowed free will, which is good, in order to make sure of sin, which is bad, and of which the evil outweighs the good of free will. The demiurge, he might continue, created some virtuous men, in order that they might be punished by the wicked; for the punishment of the virtuous is so great an evil that it makes the world worse than if no good men existed (Russell 590).
This an exact opposite of Leibniz’s argument for the problem of evil and the best of all possible worlds which says that free will is the good allowed by sin, which is evil, in a world created by a benevolent creator. The Manichean argument hinges on the premise that this is the worst of all possible worlds, and is therefore an exact negative of Leibniz’s the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz’s theocentrism, however, saves him from this refutation. Leibniz’s metaphysics is based on Scripture, as demonstrated earlier. Scripture has numerous references to the power of good over evil. The example, “The evil bow down before the good, the wicked at the gates of the righteous” (Bible Proverbs 14:9), shows the inferiority of evil in the context of servitude. Evil, in bowing down before good, acts as a lesser to a superior. This is in line with Leibniz’s argument that all evils serve to magnify the pleasure of the good. Thus, even the exact negative falls short due to Leibniz’s theocentric premises. Furthermore, if argument A is to be refuted by argument –A and equal zero, than argument –A must be just as valid in degree as argument A. The negative A arguments presented here to do not live up to this standard. The remainder is always one. To Leibniz, this one always points back to God, not the self as in Descartes.
The self is a finite thing, as Descartes demonstrated. As such, it is not a sufficient reason for the existence of God, to use Leibnizian terms. Otherwise, with the death of the self, there would also be the death of God. Though many people, philosophers and scientists and laymen alike, have either tried to kill God or are actively doing so. However, they have died and will die themselves before succeeding. This is mostly due to God’s ontological status. By definition, He is eternal, un-killable, and supreme. Therefore it is only self-evident that any theocentric argument would ultimately last longer and be more complete than any egocentric argument.
WORKS CITED
Descartes, Rene Meditations, Objections, and Replies. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
Leibniz, Gottfried. Philosophical Texts. Ed.Woolhouse, R.S. and Francks, Richard. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.,1998.
Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.
The Holy Bible, ESV. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Bibles, 2001.
Werther, David. “Leibniz and the Possibility of God’s Existence.” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 37-48.
Bombardi, Ron. How the Rationalists Construe “Clear and Distinct Ideas”. http://frank.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/cnd.html
Torrey, Henry P.A. The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from his Writings. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892.
In the 17th century, science was the domain of the church and of wealthy aristocrats. In Europe at this time, one did not easily become an aristocrat and have views counter to the church. Therefore, most science which was produced had to find some way to fit within the bounds of scholasticism and Catholic theology. The problem, however, was that science was beginning to discover certain empirical truths which were contrary to church theology. Luckily, there were those who wanted to have their cake and eat it too, so to speak. These individuals were not only scientists; they were also pious men who called themselves philosophers. These men were on the cutting edge of mathematics, physics, and geometry, and yet were able to develop philosophical theories which sought to reconcile the most important of theologies and science. Two of these men, Rene Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz, were among the first to re-invent the most central of Catholic theologies –the existence of God –with contemporary scientific and empirical method. There are many differences between these two philosophers, although there is one central contrast which can serve as an axiom in explaining those differences; specifically, the degree of theocentrism in their respective philosophies. Leibniz’s theocentrism was absolute, while Descartes was only theocentric so far as his philosophy of Self was concerned. In other words, Descartes was more egocentric: God’s existence was only discernible via Descartes own existence, whereas Leibniz’s ideas of God were not dependent upon himself at all.
Let us begin with Descartes.
Descartes’ mission is stated in the second meditation of his publication, Meditations, Objections, and Replies: “I will set aside whatever can be weakened even to the slightest degree by the arguments brought forward, so that eventually all that remains is precisely what is certain and unshaken” (Descartes 25). He finds the most extreme skepticism, that of the Evil Genius, and from there doubts everything. His skepticism leads him to doubt his sensory perceptions because, after all, he may be being tricked by some supernatural force. He can not prove their trustworthiness, and so he casts them aside. Since his sensory perceptions are transmitted through his body, he also decides this may not exist. In doing so, he signifies a difference between body and mind. So while he is unsure of the existence of his body, his mind most surely does. For, the only way he could be deceived is if he had a thinking mind capable of being deceived. Thus, he forms the cogito argument, “I am, I exist” (Descartes 25). If he is existing without a material body, than his mind must be his soul. He says this is self-evident because it is a clear and distinct idea.
A clear and distinct idea, as defined by Rom Bombardi of Middle Tennessee State University is, “An idea is clear and distinct if and only if all and only properties essential to the object of that idea (its referent or ideatum) are represented in the idea” (Bombardi 6). It is thus self-evident. From here, Descartes decides there are certain ideas in his mind which are clear and distinct. These ideas are purely mental and self-evident. Since the idea of God contains all the properties of God, than it stands to say that God is a clear and distinct idea. Descartes reasons that because he is of a finite existence, and the clear and distinct idea of God contains the property of infinite existence, than the idea of God could not have been thought of by him. Henry Torrey explains this thusly in his The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from His Writing, “The effect cannot transcend the cause; but if God did not exist, the presence of the idea of infinite perfection within a finite consciousness would be inexplicable; the effect would transcend the cause” (Torrey 19). This is an apriori argument for the existence of God, also known as an ontological proof. Descartes ontological proof of God works in that the idea of infinite existence is only available with the actual quality of infinite experience. Such a Being is a Perfect Being, and to such a Perfect Being, the act of deception would be contradictory. Therefore, this Being is not a Deceiver and can be trusted. From here, Descartes reasons that because God exists, the world must exist as he perceives it and he can now go on to explain everything else with which he is concerned.
Throughout all of this, there is one glaring attribute: the existence of the self as necessary for all other reasoning. This is not to say Descartes is not a pious man, but his philosophy is definitely more self-centered than it is God-centered. Torrey elaborates, “Philosophical speculation thereafter must turn on the ego, which Descartes thus made the pivot of his own thinking concerning real experience” (18). Descartes is concerned with how he can know things are real, how his experience is affected by mind and body, and how his thoughts are necessary to prove the existence of God. This ultimately leads to Cartesian Dualism, in which everything is defined as Self and Not-Self. His theocentrism is ambiguous and takes second place to egocentrism. After necessarily proving God’s existence, he moves on to his metaphysics which are thereafter devoid of any theology. This is in stark contrast to Leibniz, whose own theocentrism is irrefutable.
Leibniz had four proofs of God. These proofs, as defined by Bertrand Russell, are, “the ontological argument, (2) the cosmological argument, (3) the argument from eternal truths, (4) the argument from pre-established harmony, which may be generalized into the argument from design…” (Russell 585). The first of these proofs, ontological, is also dependent upon a definition of God as a Perfect Being. This God contains all power and all knowledge, for “power and knowledge are perfections, and in so far as they belong to God, who possesses supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner, not only in a metaphysical sense, but also morally speaking” (Leibniz 1.1). Furthermore, two of his three initial premises are based on the Scriptures (1.2, 1.3). Essentially, for this argument, Leibniz takes what Descartes has done and improves upon it in a more theocentric fashion. He takes God’s existence, and instead of making our knowledge of God’s existence central to the fact, he demonstrates it in the realm of possibilities. If there is a possibility of God, than God is real since God’s nature is the fullness of perfect possibility. Leibniz argues that God is possible because the concept of God as a Being of Pure Perfection is non-contradictory. Therefore, God’s existence is central to the best of all possible worlds, i.e. this one. As a central point, this proof of God has nothing to do with the Self, and everything to do with God Himself. Leibniz follows as it says in Scripture, “So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God” (Bible ESV 1Corinthians 10:31).
The cosmological argument is similar to First Cause, however in Leibniz’s metaphysics there is no causality. Instead, all things are contingent upon a sufficient reason. If there is no reason for a thing to exist in this, the best of all possible worlds, than it will not exist. The only sufficient reason for anything to exist in this world is the will of God. This is similar to Descartes notion of Substance, which is a thing that does not depend on anything else (Descartes, Meditation Six). In this definition of substance, there are only three substances: Mind, Matter, and God. Which are, once again, totally dependent upon the Self if they are to be employed in existence. The difference, however, is that God is not simply causing reality for the benefit of the experiencer. God is causing all reality, for his own reasons. Whatever that reason may be, it is omni-benevolent and omniscient. Thus, God’s qualities and not the Self are the determining factors of this proof, which would make it contingent upon the ontological argument.
Third is the argument from eternal truths. An eternal truth is a statement which can not be denied, and is always true within the context of itself. Statements such as ‘one and one is two’ are eternal truths. An eternal truth is an apriori statement which is neither contingent, nor needs any sufficient reason. It is part of the law of the universe, and as such an extension of the cosmological argument. Since it is apriori it must occur in the mind, and the only eternal mind (and sufficient reason) is God. Thereofre all eternal truths point back to God. An eternal truth is similar to Descartes Clear and Distinct Idea in that it is an apriori statement which is self-evident on all fronts. However, an eternal truth is not dependent upon the mind for its existence, it is a function of reality instead, and therefore theocentric, not egocentric.
Finally, there is the argument from pre-established harmony, or design. This argument is based upon Leibniz’s Monadology, which contends that “windowless” monads, quasi-mental psychic components of reality, are perfectly harmonized with one another to create the existing world. This may seem as a bit of a stretch, but the idea of monads is consistent with all other arguments. With the ontological argument: God is omniscient and perfect, therefore anything He creates will be perfect, and the monad is the perfect tool. With the cosmological: the monad is the vehicle for sufficient cause; its existence is possible and is powered by God into full existence. With eternal truths: the monads carry all thoughts necessary for their existence in themselves, including eternal truths. These monads work completely in conjunction with one another while not perceiving each other in the slightest. After all, they have no windows. Therefore, this perfect harmony is evident of Gods existence, and dependent solely upon God Himself. Thus all the glory here goes to God and none goes to the philosopher or the mind which perceives Him.
Despite Descartes’ egocentricity, his philosophy is not unsound, it is merely Self-centered. Everything about Descartes method is heavily dependent upon the Self. This makes the arguments rather fragile, however. Torrey says, “Much of his thinking, after two and a half centuries has now become obsolete; much still remains an imperishable addition to the sum of human philosophy” (Torrey 16). This happened mostly because science and philosophy were readily able to move outside of the self. However, Descartes methodical doubt gave rise to the empirical method and axiomatic logic, without which no one could have gone any further than him. It should be noted that all of Europe was very nervous as Descartes lay on his death bed; for no one was sure if upon his death reality would cease existing. Luckily, this was not the case, and thus Leibniz had a chance to write and improve on Descartes philosophy.
Leibniz, however, offers to stand the test of time. This is in part because of his theocentricity. In basing his arguments on an eternal and perfect Being, and not on the self, they will continue to be applicable until the definition of that Being changes, if ever. And while the premises of Descartes arguments may begin to break down with further advances in science, Leibniz will persist. The only place where Leibniz’s logic seems to fail is when it is presented with the opposite of itself. For example, David Werther, in his article Leibniz and God’s Existence goes through many pains to make a linear argument of Leibniz which looks similar to this:
(1) If the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is true, it is necessarily true, and, similarly, if the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is true, it is necessarily true.
(2)Either the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is true, or the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is true.
(3)Hence, either the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is consistent' is necessarily true, or the concept of 'The Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is necessarily true (Werther 41).
This continues to include the status of perfections and compatibilities, and ends with the reasoning, “All perfections are compatible,” (Werther 41). He then makes a counter argument which shares the first three premises and offers the linguistic opposite of the final six:
(4*) 'The Concept of the Most Perfect Being is consistent' is necessarily true only if statements of the form 'Divine Perfections A and B can be in the subject' are either explicit identity statements whose truth can be demonstrated through analysis.
(5*) 'Statements of the form 'Divine Perfections A and B can be in the same subject' are neither explicit identity statements no statements whose truth can be demonstrated through analysis.
(6*) Hence, 'The concept of the Most Perfect Being is consistent is not necessarily true.
(7*) hence, 'The concept of the Most Perfect Being is inconsistent' is necessarily true. (Werther 42)
And so on until he ends with the reasoning, “All perfections are incompatible,” (Werther 42). While at first, this may seem to refute Leibniz’s argument, or at least to make it ineffective, it does not really do so. It merely shows the effectiveness of the structure of an argument which allows the negative to prove logically possible. Though, in Leibnizian terms, while ‘The concept of the Most Perfect Being is inconsistent’ is logically possible, it is not the best possible truth because of its lack of sufficient reason. Since it is not the best possible truth, it is not present in this, the best of all possible worlds.
This can be demonstrated once more. Bertrand Russell, in his work A History of Western Philosophy offers a Manichean argument.
…this is the worst of all possible worlds, in which the good things that exist serve only to heighten the evils. The world, he might say, was created by a wicked demiurge, who allowed free will, which is good, in order to make sure of sin, which is bad, and of which the evil outweighs the good of free will. The demiurge, he might continue, created some virtuous men, in order that they might be punished by the wicked; for the punishment of the virtuous is so great an evil that it makes the world worse than if no good men existed (Russell 590).
This an exact opposite of Leibniz’s argument for the problem of evil and the best of all possible worlds which says that free will is the good allowed by sin, which is evil, in a world created by a benevolent creator. The Manichean argument hinges on the premise that this is the worst of all possible worlds, and is therefore an exact negative of Leibniz’s the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz’s theocentrism, however, saves him from this refutation. Leibniz’s metaphysics is based on Scripture, as demonstrated earlier. Scripture has numerous references to the power of good over evil. The example, “The evil bow down before the good, the wicked at the gates of the righteous” (Bible Proverbs 14:9), shows the inferiority of evil in the context of servitude. Evil, in bowing down before good, acts as a lesser to a superior. This is in line with Leibniz’s argument that all evils serve to magnify the pleasure of the good. Thus, even the exact negative falls short due to Leibniz’s theocentric premises. Furthermore, if argument A is to be refuted by argument –A and equal zero, than argument –A must be just as valid in degree as argument A. The negative A arguments presented here to do not live up to this standard. The remainder is always one. To Leibniz, this one always points back to God, not the self as in Descartes.
The self is a finite thing, as Descartes demonstrated. As such, it is not a sufficient reason for the existence of God, to use Leibnizian terms. Otherwise, with the death of the self, there would also be the death of God. Though many people, philosophers and scientists and laymen alike, have either tried to kill God or are actively doing so. However, they have died and will die themselves before succeeding. This is mostly due to God’s ontological status. By definition, He is eternal, un-killable, and supreme. Therefore it is only self-evident that any theocentric argument would ultimately last longer and be more complete than any egocentric argument.
WORKS CITED
Descartes, Rene Meditations, Objections, and Replies. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
Leibniz, Gottfried. Philosophical Texts. Ed.Woolhouse, R.S. and Francks, Richard. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.,1998.
Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.
The Holy Bible, ESV. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Bibles, 2001.
Werther, David. “Leibniz and the Possibility of God’s Existence.” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 37-48.
Bombardi, Ron. How the Rationalists Construe “Clear and Distinct Ideas”. http://frank.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/cnd.html
Torrey, Henry P.A. The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from his Writings. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892.
Thoughts on Dostoyevsky: Two men and the rise of relativism
This is another response paper I turned in to my existentialism professor. Here I am responding to Dostoyevsky's The Underground Man and my comparison of the two types of men presented therein. I used this as a prototype to my upcoming essay, From Pilate to Nietzche: Postmodernism and the Prince of This World.
The Underground Man uses the dichotomy of the man of action vs. the man of acute self-consciousness to raise some very interesting arguments against the traditional western philosophical world and present an example of what would become existentialist thought. In this dichotomy, the man of action represents the “natural” man whom is the subject of traditional philosophy and science, and the man of acute consciousness is the “modern” man of contemporary civilization from whom the rebellion of existentialism arises. He clarifies the difference of these two through the use of a metaphorical wall. The wall, and how these two approach the wall are of infinite importance in defining what separates them, and thereby separating the difference in existentialism to traditional philosophy.
The wall is the invention of the gentleman the Underground Man is addressing. “What stone wall? Why, of course, the laws of nature, the deductions of natural science, mathematics… When they prove to you that in reality one drop of your own fat must be dearer to you than a hundred thousand of your fellow creatures, and that this conclusion is the final solution of all so-called virtues and duties… then you have to accept it,” (Dostoevsky 61). This wall, is the product of Western Philosophy. It is the laws which science and philosophy have made, stating objective truths about reality, in which the individual has no say. This wall is natural, universal, irrefutable law.
Of the man of action, the Underground man feels, “such a direct person I regard as the real normal man, as his tender mother nature wished to see him… He is stupid” (Dostoevsky 59). Notice the Underground Man says his mother nature. He also says that the man of acute self-consciousness is a retort-made man, implying a distance from the natural. In this sense, there is a distinct difference from what the Underground Man is implying about himself with what traditional western philosophy says makes a human being. The man of action runs to the wall, and accepts the wall. The man of acute consciousness runs to the wall and spends the rest of his life staring in anger and spite at the wall.
The man of action and of nature is identified by his own action and nature. So much so, in fact, that his identity is entirely contained within this perception. When he feels he is slighted, he runs and runs toward the object of his vengeance, “and nothing but a wall will stop him… but of the wall later,” (Dostoevsky 59). When he encounters the wall, he genuinely recedes with no remorse, for the wall is the laws of nature, and him, being a man of nature is satisfied. Towards the man of acute-consciousness, the man who is unable to chase the object of revenge, or to even feel revenge, he feels condescension and laughs. He is able to do this because as a man of nature he actually has a nature, unlike the man of acute-consciousness, who can’t even raise the will to defend himself. But the man of acute conciousness can be whatever he wants to be. In the case of the Underground Man, this is a spiteful creature. He wants to be against the wall of natural laws dictated by scholars, and he is thus defined by his own choice, and not those choices which are made for him that he cannot refute, and thereby setting up the subjectivism which stands in spite the traditional philosophical mode and is inherent in most existentialist thinkers to follow.
The Underground Man uses the dichotomy of the man of action vs. the man of acute self-consciousness to raise some very interesting arguments against the traditional western philosophical world and present an example of what would become existentialist thought. In this dichotomy, the man of action represents the “natural” man whom is the subject of traditional philosophy and science, and the man of acute consciousness is the “modern” man of contemporary civilization from whom the rebellion of existentialism arises. He clarifies the difference of these two through the use of a metaphorical wall. The wall, and how these two approach the wall are of infinite importance in defining what separates them, and thereby separating the difference in existentialism to traditional philosophy.
The wall is the invention of the gentleman the Underground Man is addressing. “What stone wall? Why, of course, the laws of nature, the deductions of natural science, mathematics… When they prove to you that in reality one drop of your own fat must be dearer to you than a hundred thousand of your fellow creatures, and that this conclusion is the final solution of all so-called virtues and duties… then you have to accept it,” (Dostoevsky 61). This wall, is the product of Western Philosophy. It is the laws which science and philosophy have made, stating objective truths about reality, in which the individual has no say. This wall is natural, universal, irrefutable law.
Of the man of action, the Underground man feels, “such a direct person I regard as the real normal man, as his tender mother nature wished to see him… He is stupid” (Dostoevsky 59). Notice the Underground Man says his mother nature. He also says that the man of acute self-consciousness is a retort-made man, implying a distance from the natural. In this sense, there is a distinct difference from what the Underground Man is implying about himself with what traditional western philosophy says makes a human being. The man of action runs to the wall, and accepts the wall. The man of acute consciousness runs to the wall and spends the rest of his life staring in anger and spite at the wall.
The man of action and of nature is identified by his own action and nature. So much so, in fact, that his identity is entirely contained within this perception. When he feels he is slighted, he runs and runs toward the object of his vengeance, “and nothing but a wall will stop him… but of the wall later,” (Dostoevsky 59). When he encounters the wall, he genuinely recedes with no remorse, for the wall is the laws of nature, and him, being a man of nature is satisfied. Towards the man of acute-consciousness, the man who is unable to chase the object of revenge, or to even feel revenge, he feels condescension and laughs. He is able to do this because as a man of nature he actually has a nature, unlike the man of acute-consciousness, who can’t even raise the will to defend himself. But the man of acute conciousness can be whatever he wants to be. In the case of the Underground Man, this is a spiteful creature. He wants to be against the wall of natural laws dictated by scholars, and he is thus defined by his own choice, and not those choices which are made for him that he cannot refute, and thereby setting up the subjectivism which stands in spite the traditional philosophical mode and is inherent in most existentialist thinkers to follow.
Some thoughts on Kierkegaard.
This is an old response paper to Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling which I turned in to an existentialism class. The question was what I thought about Abraham sacrificing Isaac. Did I think it was moral?
Johannes de Silentio is arguing from a Kantian/Hegelian ethical perspective which offers universal good for the whole of a society as the ultimate decisive factor in an ethical decision. According to that paradigm, when Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac, he is not acting for a universal good. Rather he is acting on the strength of the absurd, believing that Isaac will be restored, or he is infinitely resigned to life without Isaac. Normally in ancient stories concerning human sacrifice, there is an ethical consideration, and pains are made to ensure the social acceptability of the sacrifice. The story of Agamemnon, for instance, also involves the sacrifice of an offspring. However, in this case the sacrifice is made for a very specific purpose, which will benefit the nation as a whole. In sacrificing his daughter, he achieves the most good for the most people at the expense of the self and thus exemplifies the Hegelian model. In Agamemnon’s story, there is a justifiable teleological suspension of ethics. For Abraham however, there is no greater good to appeal to, simply God’s whim. Thus there are two possibilities for Abraham’s actions. Either Abraham is above Ethical considerations, in which case God can arbitrarily change morality, or he is below them in the realm of pure sensuality.
In response, I would say that neither God nor Abraham are functioning upon a Hegelian paradigm of ethics, and so long as such is the premise, any conclusions will be inconclusive, as they are in Fear and Trembling. It seems that De Silentio is working from a false premise, because he is not accepting the full relationship which Abraham and God have established at this point. God has proven His faithfulness to Abraham time and time again. Thus Abraham had sufficient faith to believe that God will still keep His promise despite all evidence to the contrary. In this sense, Abraham does indeed rely upon the strength of the absurd, however this need not be a mystifying thing. God has revealed His character to Abraham to be such, and this revelation is the determining factor in Abraham's actions, not any ethical concerns (Hegelian or no) which, in Abraham's view, would ultimately be worthless when compared to God's fulfilling of His morality.
Furthermore, up until this point in God's history, He has not dictated a definitive morality in such terms as "Thou shalt not, etc." (except, of course, the command concerning the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil). The commandments came with Moses, who is descended from Abraham, and The Law came with the Levitical priesthood after the Israelites return from Egypt. Concerning sacrifice, the prime story which Abraham may have had access to would have been the story of Cain and Abel. Abel made sacrifice which was pleasing to God because of His faith and devotion to God. Cain was only found in disfavor because his heart was wicked with jealousy and rage. Thus, Abraham had learned to make sacrifice with joy.
For Abraham, not only is God worthy of the sacrifice of Isaac, but He also keeps His promises. These would have been Abraham's motives, and these would have been sufficient for Abraham to do what he did. He had no concern for social or ethical considerations, and therefore any attempt to understand what he did along those lines will be, as they were for Silentio, inconclusive.
Johannes de Silentio is arguing from a Kantian/Hegelian ethical perspective which offers universal good for the whole of a society as the ultimate decisive factor in an ethical decision. According to that paradigm, when Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac, he is not acting for a universal good. Rather he is acting on the strength of the absurd, believing that Isaac will be restored, or he is infinitely resigned to life without Isaac. Normally in ancient stories concerning human sacrifice, there is an ethical consideration, and pains are made to ensure the social acceptability of the sacrifice. The story of Agamemnon, for instance, also involves the sacrifice of an offspring. However, in this case the sacrifice is made for a very specific purpose, which will benefit the nation as a whole. In sacrificing his daughter, he achieves the most good for the most people at the expense of the self and thus exemplifies the Hegelian model. In Agamemnon’s story, there is a justifiable teleological suspension of ethics. For Abraham however, there is no greater good to appeal to, simply God’s whim. Thus there are two possibilities for Abraham’s actions. Either Abraham is above Ethical considerations, in which case God can arbitrarily change morality, or he is below them in the realm of pure sensuality.
In response, I would say that neither God nor Abraham are functioning upon a Hegelian paradigm of ethics, and so long as such is the premise, any conclusions will be inconclusive, as they are in Fear and Trembling. It seems that De Silentio is working from a false premise, because he is not accepting the full relationship which Abraham and God have established at this point. God has proven His faithfulness to Abraham time and time again. Thus Abraham had sufficient faith to believe that God will still keep His promise despite all evidence to the contrary. In this sense, Abraham does indeed rely upon the strength of the absurd, however this need not be a mystifying thing. God has revealed His character to Abraham to be such, and this revelation is the determining factor in Abraham's actions, not any ethical concerns (Hegelian or no) which, in Abraham's view, would ultimately be worthless when compared to God's fulfilling of His morality.
Furthermore, up until this point in God's history, He has not dictated a definitive morality in such terms as "Thou shalt not, etc." (except, of course, the command concerning the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil). The commandments came with Moses, who is descended from Abraham, and The Law came with the Levitical priesthood after the Israelites return from Egypt. Concerning sacrifice, the prime story which Abraham may have had access to would have been the story of Cain and Abel. Abel made sacrifice which was pleasing to God because of His faith and devotion to God. Cain was only found in disfavor because his heart was wicked with jealousy and rage. Thus, Abraham had learned to make sacrifice with joy.
For Abraham, not only is God worthy of the sacrifice of Isaac, but He also keeps His promises. These would have been Abraham's motives, and these would have been sufficient for Abraham to do what he did. He had no concern for social or ethical considerations, and therefore any attempt to understand what he did along those lines will be, as they were for Silentio, inconclusive.
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